Tax-Rate Biases in Tax Decisions: Experimental Evidence by Amberger, Harald et al.
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727680 
 
WU International Taxation Research Paper Series 
No. 2016 - 01 
 
Tax Rate Biases in Tax Planning Decisions:  
Experimental Evidence   
  
 
Harald Amberger 
Eva Eberhartinger 
Matthias Kasper 
 
Editors: 
Eva Eberhartinger, Michael Lang, Rupert Sausgruber and Martin Zagler (Vienna University of 
Economics and Business), and Erich Kirchler (University of Vienna) 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727680 
 
Tax Rate Biases in Tax Planning Decisions:  
Experimental Evidence 
 
Harald Amberger* 
Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Department of Finance, Accounting and Statistics 
Tax Management Group 
harald.amberger@wu.ac.at 
 
 
Eva Eberhartinger 
Vienna University of Economics and Business 
Department of Finance, Accounting and Statistics 
Tax Management Group 
eva.eberhartinger@wu.ac.at 
 
 
Matthias Kasper 
Vienna University of Economics and Business 
WU Global Tax Policy Center 
University of Vienna 
Faculty of Psychology 
matthias.kasper@wu.ac.at 
 
 
Keywords: 
heuristics, decision bias, salience, tax planning, intra-group financing, overconfidence 
 
JEL-Classification: 
C91, D03, H32, K34, M21, M41 
 
 
We appreciate valuable comments from Kathleen Andries, Sebastian Beer, Tobias Bornemann, Erich Kirchler, 
Saskia Kohlhase, Petro Lisowsky, Ben Lockwood (discussant), Michaele Morrow (discussant), Martina 
Rechbauer, Bill Rees and Rupert Sausgruber, three anonymous reviewers for the 22nd Journal of the American 
Taxation Association (JATA) Conference, participants at the 108th NTA Conference on Taxation in Boston, the 
5th Workshop on Current Research in Taxation in Prague, the 5th Doctoral Meeting of the Oxford University 
Centre for Business Taxation in Oxford, the 2015 IAREP-SABE Joint Conference in Sibiu, the 1st Doctoral 
Colloquium of the British Accounting and Finance Association SAG (BAFA) in Edinburgh, the 2nd Doctoral 
Research Seminar in Vienna and seminar participants in the DIBT Research Seminar at WU Vienna. Harald 
Amberger and Matthias Kasper gratefully acknowledge financial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF): 
W 1235-G16. Matthias Kasper gratefully acknowledges financial support by the Austrian National Bank 
(OeNB): 16042. 
 
* Corresponding Author: Harald Amberger, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria. 
He can be reached at harald.amberger@wu.ac.at or +43/1/31336-5656. 
 This is a draft version; please do not cite or circulate without the permission of the authors. 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2727680 
 
Tax Rate Biases in Tax Planning Decisions:  
Experimental Evidence 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Contrary to standard economic theory, recent empirical findings suggest that firms do not always 
minimize their tax payments. We conduct a laboratory experiment and find robust evidence that 
decision biases offer a behavioral explanation for suboptimal tax planning. When facing time pressure 
in an intra-group, cross-border financing decision, subjects apply heuristics based on the salience of 
statutory tax rates. This stirs decision makers to underestimate the effects of tax base changes and 
causes economically suboptimal tax planning decisions. We find that tax planning behavior is, to a 
large extent, unaffected by subjects’ work experience or education in accounting, taxation, and/or 
finance. Yet, we observe an overconfidence bias in subjects with moderate work experience. In line 
with models of rational inattention, an increasing tax burden difference between two tax planning 
strategies weakly mitigates the use of heuristics and thus the decision bias. 
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1. Introduction 
The present paper investigates behavioral aspects of tax planning decisions by analyzing the 
role of tax base and tax rate effects. While in recent years the focus of public scrutiny and academic 
research has been on tax avoidance of U.S. and multinational firms (e.g. Dyreng, Hanlon, and 
Maydew 2008; Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt 2013), only little attention has been paid to firms 
that appear to not minimize their tax payments. At the firm level, effective tax rates (ETRs) differ 
considerably where the sources of variation are yet not fully understood (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). 
Dyreng et al. (2008), for instance, find that one-fourth of the firms in their sample persistently pays 
taxes in excess of the statutory U.S. corporate tax rate. In accounting research the term 
“undersheltering puzzle” was coined for this phenomenon (Weisbach 2002; Desai and Dharmapala 
2006; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010; Gallemore, Maydew, and Thornock 2014). Building on this 
empirical evidence, we investigate whether decision biases cause economically suboptimal tax 
planning behavior. 
Standard economic theory assumes that agents make optimal choices and consider all 
relevant information. As a result, when deciding on whether to implement a tax planning scheme, 
decision makers balance all costs and benefits to maximize the principal’s economic benefit (Scholes, 
Wolfson, Erickson, Hanlon, Maydew, and Shevlin 2015). With constant non-tax factors, an optimal 
tax planning decision likewise depends on tax rate and tax base effects (Hines and Rice, 1994; 
Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme 2008). However, it is well-established that behavioral aspects shape 
decision making. Previous research drawing on the work of Simon (1955) and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974, 1981) shows that individuals could be prone to decision biases due to simplified decision 
making based on heuristics. For the case of taxation, empirical findings indicate that decisions, if 
based on heuristics, could result in economically suboptimal outcomes. Graham, Hanlon, Shevlin, and 
Shroff (2015), for instance, show that managers base financial decisions on salient information such as 
the average tax rate, rather than on less accessible but more accurate information (e.g. the marginal tax 
rate). The firms in their sample experience an estimated average financial loss of $10 million due to 
poorly designed capital structures and of $25 million caused by suboptimal acquisitions. Along the 
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same lines, Powers, Seidman, and Stomberg (2015) find that the U.S. statutory tax rate serves as a 
heuristic that reduces information processing costs.  
An experimental study by Blaufus, Bob, Hundsdoerfer, Kiesewetter, and Weimann (2013) 
provides evidence that subjects take biased decisions when instructed to choose the tax system with 
the lowest tax burden among a set of alternatives. In line with earlier research that identified salience 
as a key driver for taxpayer behavior (Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009), the authors conjecture that tax 
rate effects are more salient than tax base effects, and thus affect choices more strongly. However, 
Blaufus et al. (2013) do not investigate the effect of situational or personal factors on the probability of 
taking biased decisions, and the authors are not able to rule out that their results are driven by a lack of 
knowledge or understanding of the task. Apart from these studies, behavioral aspects of tax planning 
have received little scholarly attention. Inefficient tax structures, however, could reduce a firm’s 
competitiveness, investment and growth (Eberhartinger and Fellner-Röhling 2016; Donohoe, 
Lisowsky, and Mayberry 2015) which increases the need for a more profound understanding of tax 
planning behavior. By following these lines, it is necessary to further investigate whether tax burden 
differences across firms stem from purely economic arguments, or whether the variation could partly 
be driven by biased behavioral patterns. 
In exploring the behavioral dimension of tax planning, the present paper adds to the 
understanding of tax planning decisions and the heterogeneity in firms’ ETRs. We investigate various 
aspects of tax planning decisions that have not been addressed in the literature, and extend current 
research on the processing of tax-related information (e.g. Blaufus et al. 2013; Graham et al. 2015; 
Powers et al. 2015). More precisely, we provide a comprehensive analysis of multiple factors that 
influence the outcome of tax planning decisions. First, we analyze the effects of tax rate and tax base 
changes on decision making. Second, we explore how resource constraints affect tax planning 
decisions. Specifically, we examine whether time pressure as a proxy for resource constraints 
stimulates the use of heuristics. Third, we analyze whether the use of heuristics is mitigated by 
personal experience such as work experience or education in accounting, taxation, and/or finance. 
Fourth, we explore how financial consequences of tax planning decisions influence decision making. 
More precisely, we investigate whether, in line with the theory of rational inattention, the use of 
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heuristics decreases with an increasing tax advantageousness of a tax planning strategy (Abeler and 
Jaeger 2015). 
We take an experimental approach to analyze the role of tax rate and tax base effects in tax 
planning decisions. Therefore, we design a basic intra-group, cross-border financing scenario and vary 
statutory tax rates and tax bases. Based on that, we ask subjects to indicate the tax-minimizing form of 
financing (equity or debt capital). Unlike alternative research designs such as survey studies, an 
experiment allows us to objectively identify the relative importance of specific factors. We model tax 
rate effects via differences in statutory tax rates (i.e. the tax rate differential) between the financed 
entity and the financing entity, while tax base effects are modelled via a tax loss carry-forward at the 
financed subsidiary. Our sample includes experienced students from a public business university in [to 
be resolved] who have a solid background in business administration, business law, and/or economics. 
Our study provides consistent evidence that tax planning decisions could lead to 
economically suboptimal results as decision makers underestimate tax base effects. While we do not 
find systematic decision biases in situations with unlimited decision time, time pressure significantly 
aggravates systematically biased decision making. Under time pressure, decision performance is, to a 
large extent, unaffected by participants’ work experience or education in accounting, taxation, and/or 
finance. Subjects with moderate work experience of up to six months, however, indicate high 
confidence in having identified the tax-minimizing form of financing, yet at the same time they 
perform relatively poorly. Such a behavior suggests an overconfidence bias in these individuals as 
they rely on their knowledge rather than seeking additional information (Zacharakis and Shepherd 
2001). Finally, we observe that an increasing tax burden difference between two tax planning 
strategies weakly mitigates the decision bias. Taken together, these findings suggest that certain 
aspects of firms’ tax behavior (such as the heterogeneity in ETRs or the undersheltering puzzle) could 
– at least partly – be driven by decision biases. 
This paper proceeds as follows: Section two outlines a simple model for tax preferences in 
intra-group financing decisions under the assumption of optimal decision making, and develops our 
behavioral hypotheses. Section three describes the experimental design, with results presented in 
section four. Section five discusses the main implications of our findings and potential limitations. 
- 4 - 
2. Theoretical Background 
2.1. A Model for Optimal Tax Planning through Intra-Group Financing 
Tax planning is economically optimal behavior if it reduces costs and increases shareholder 
wealth. Widely adopted tax planning schemes involve discretion in setting intra-group transfer prices 
for intermediate inputs (Klassen and LaPlante 2012; Beer and Loeprick 2015), domestic or cross-
border structures to benefit from special tax regimes (Dyreng and Lindsey 2009; Dyreng, Lindsey, and 
Thornock 2013), as well as specific instruments like financial hybrids (Johannesen 2014), derivatives 
(Donohoe 2015), and insurance contracts (Brown 2011). In addition to these schemes, profit shifting 
through intra-group debt financing is widespread (Heckemeyer and Overesch 2013). Internal capital 
markets enable multinationals to exploit tax rate differentials (Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004) and to 
shift profits via interest payments (Buettner and Wamser 2013). Empirical evidence supports this 
claim, given that low-taxed group members finance their high-taxed counterparts with intra-group debt 
(Huizinga et al. 2008; Buettner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser 2009; Overesch and Wamser 2014). 
Aside from statutory tax rates, several tax system features affect the tax base of a firm and 
thus the choice of an optimal tax planning scheme. An example of a tax base effect is the possibility to 
carry tax losses forward, which may reduce a firm’s periodic tax base and turn a high-taxed entity into 
a low-taxed one. As a result, profit shifting via interest payments on intra-group debt and a tax loss 
carry-forward may conflict with each other, as the tax benefit from the interest deduction does not 
materialize if the entity does not pay taxes due to a tax loss carry-forward. These interest payments 
are, at the same time, subject to taxation at the receiving entity which induces double taxation. 
In the following, we derive tax preferences of a multinational for intra-group equity or debt. 
We assume economically optimal decision making and consider a parent company A with its wholly 
owned foreign subsidiary B. The firms earn π୅ and π୆ which denote taxable income before deducting 
interest payments on intra-group debt or a tax loss carry-forward. The tax base after deducting interest 
payments or a tax loss carry-forward is taxable at the statutory tax rates τ୅ and τ୆, respectively.1 The 
parent A may finance its subsidiary B via intra-group equity or debt. A is risk neutral and has no 
                                                            
1 Given our interest in the trade-off between the tax rate differential and the tax loss carry-forward, we assume 
that πୟ ൒ 0; πୠ ൒ Lୠ; Iୠ ൒ 0; and πୠ ൒ Iୠ where any unused tax loss carry-forward will be forfeited. Moreover, 
we abstract from agency considerations, information asymmetries and tax planning costs. 
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preference for either form of financing. If A chooses equity financing, dividends are neither tax 
deductible for the subsidiary nor taxable at the level of the parent company. If the subsidiary is 
financed via debt, interest payments I are tax deductible at the subsidiary and taxed at the parent 
company. In a one-period setting, A selects the form of intra-group financing which implies the 
smallest group tax burden. 
First, the group tax burden for equity financing T୉ in a given period amounts to 
T୉ ൌ πୟτୟ ൅ ሺπୠ െ Lୠሻ	τୠ, (1) 
where Lୠ	denotes the amount of tax loss carry-forward available at B which is equal to or 
less than πୠ. As a result, πୠ is sufficiently large to offset an existing tax loss carry-forward which 
implies Lୠ ൑ 	πୠ to hold. Any unused tax loss carry-forward, however, will be forfeited in later 
periods. 
Second, the group tax burden for debt financing Tୈ in a given period amounts to 
Tୈ ൌ ሺπୟ ൅ Iሻ	τୟ ൅ ሺπୠ െ I െ θLୠሻ	τୠ, (2) 
where I indicates interest payments on intra-group debt ሺI ൐ 0ሻ which are tax deductible at 
the subsidiary and taxable at the level of the parent. θ denotes the fraction of Lୠ which can be offset 
against taxable profits after deducting I. As country B does not offer a tax refund in case of a loss, the 
deductible fraction of a Lୠ is limited to the tax base, which implies that 
θ ൌ ቊ
	1,
	஠ౘି୍୐ౘ ,
ቤ	Lୠ ൑ ሺπୠ െ Iሻ,	Lୠ ൐ ሺπୠ െ Iሻ.ቋ (3) 
ܣ selects the form of intra-group financing which yields the lowest group tax burden, thus 
min	ሼT୉, Tୈሽ. (4) 
It follows for the group tax burden to be a function of both the statutory tax rates and the tax 
loss carry-forward. These factors determine tax preferences for intra-group equity or debt financing. 
We first consider the case where θ ൌ 1. The income of the subsidiary after deducting I 
exceeds the available tax loss carry-forward. In this case, A prefers intra-group debt over equity if 
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πୟ	τୟ ൅ ሺπୠ െ Lୠሻ	τୠ ൐ 	 ሺπୟ ൅ Iሻ	τୟ ൅ ሺπୠ െ I െ Lୠሻ	τୠ. (5) 
All else being equal, the relation holds if τୟ ൏ 	 τୠ. Substituting τୠ for τୟ ൅ d where d 
denotes the difference in statutory tax rates between the subsidiary and the parent company (i.e. the tax 
rate differential; d ൌ τୠ െ τୟ) and changing the order of preferences yields a preference for intra-
group debt if 
Id ൐ 0 (6) 
If the income of the subsidiary after deducting I exceeds its tax loss carry-forward, debt 
financing is preferable in the case of a positive tax rate differential. For a negative tax rate differential, 
equity financing is the tax-minimizing choice. If d ൌ 0, A is indifferent between both forms of 
financing. Hence, preferences do not depend on the amount of tax loss carry-forward. 
Second, we consider θ ൌ ஠ౘି୍୐ౘ  where the tax loss carry-forward exceeds the subsidiary’s 
income after the deduction of I. The advantageousness of intra-group equity or debt financing again 
depends on d. It follows from (5) that A prefers debt over equity if 
ሺπୠ െ 	Lୠሻሺτୟ ൅ dሻ െ I	τୟ ൐ 0. (7) 
The definition of θ implies that I ൐ 	πୠ െ Lୠ must hold. (7) does not hold if the tax rate 
differential is negative ሺd ൏ 0ሻ or zero ሺd ൌ 0ሻ. If a subsidiary’s tax loss carry-forward exceeds its 
income after deducting I (i.e. Lୠ ൐ ሺπୠ െ Iሻ), A prefers intra-group equity over debt if its statutory tax 
rate equals or exceeds the subsidiary’s statutory tax rate. If the tax rate differential is positive ሺd ൐ 0ሻ, 
the preference depends on the tax loss carry-forward and the positive tax rate differential. 
Overall, (6) and (7) reveal that the sign of the tax rate differential determines the tax-
minimizing form of intra-group financing in a variety of scenarios. However, if a tax loss carry-
forward exceeds a subsidiary’s taxable profit after deducting interest payments and given a positive 
tax rate differential, a trade-off between the tax rate differential and the tax loss carry-forward appears 
(see Table 1). To arrive at an optimal decision (ignoring non-tax costs or benefits), both effects must 
be considered and the gain from profit shifting via intra-group debt financing must be balanced with 
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the tax consequences of foregoing a tax loss carry-forward. If agents are incentivized to exploit tax 
planning opportunities, they should resolve this conflict and minimize the group tax burden. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
While empirical evidence suggests that firms differ in their tax planning activities and a 
significant share of firms appears to not minimize their tax burden (Dyreng et al. 2008), little is known 
about the behavioral dimension of tax planning decisions. While it is acknowledged that firms use tax 
planning to reduce their effective tax burden, the overall extent of these activities tends to fall short of 
model predictions, given the vast spectrum of easily accessible tax-minimizing opportunities (Hanlon 
and Heitzman 2010).2 
While large parts of the heterogeneity in tax planning can be attributed to firms’ legal or 
economic circumstances,3 behavioral aspects could trigger suboptimal decisions in tax contexts 
(Graham et al. 2015). This notion is in line with research in behavioral economics and economic 
psychology which finds systematic biases in economic decision making where decision outcomes are 
less optimal than theoretically assumed (for a review, see Kirchler (2007)). Building on early work by 
Simon (1955) and discussing the effects of individuals’ limited knowledge and ability in decision 
making, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identify cognitive principles that guide decision making in 
complex situations. As it is often difficult to assess the consequences of a decision, individuals seek 
simplified decision strategies known as heuristics. These decision strategies affect the way information 
is processed (Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier 2011) and reduce the cognitive load of a problem, as they 
alleviate the complexity of a task (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman 2003). In contrast to 
extensive decision strategies, heuristics often do not yield economically optimal choices but could 
imply biases. 
                                                            
2 A meta-study by Feld, Heckemeyer, and Overesch (2013), for instance, finds that a 10 percentage point change 
in statutory tax rates induces only a 3 percentage point reaction in the debt ratio of a firm. 
3 For instance firms tend to differ in their financial reporting costs of tax avoidance (e.g. Frank, Lynch, and Rego 
2009; Badertscher, Philips, Pinco, and Rego 2009), regulatory costs of tax avoidance (e.g. Mills, Nutter, and 
Schwab 2013), or reputational costs of tax avoidance (e.g. Gallemore et al. 2014). 
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The literature discusses several types of heuristics (see Kahneman 2003).4 For taxation, 
McCaffery and Baron (2003) observe systematic decision biases in a series of experiments and find 
that the salience of tax information is a key heuristic. When presented with tax-related information, 
decision makers use salient information as a primary heuristic, while the remaining – yet relevant – 
information is widely neglected. Similarly, Chetty et al. (2009) show that variation in the salience of 
tax information causes systematic optimization errors, and individuals’ choices tend to be affected by 
the salience rather than the magnitude of taxes. Fochmann and Weimann (2013) find that high tax 
salience reduces tax misperception. This is in line with studies that find effects of the visibility of tax 
rates on financial decision making. For instance Rupert and Wright (1998) show that decision 
performance is positively affected by highly visible tax rate schedules. While these studies focus on 
the behavior of individual taxpayers, two recent papers provide the first evidence that corporate tax 
planning decisions could be more systematically biased than expected.5 Graham et al. (2015) 
empirically show that capital structuring and acquisition decisions could be economically suboptimal, 
as tax executives overestimate the importance of salient information when evaluating the effect of 
taxes. Along the same lines, Powers et al. (2015) find that the U.S. statutory tax rate is used as a 
heuristic to reduce information processing costs. 
With regard to tax rate and tax base effects, previous research suggests that decision makers 
consider tax rate effects more carefully than tax base effects when evaluating the economic 
consequences of tax planning decisions (e.g. Sørensen 1992; Buettner and Ruf 2007). Statutory tax 
rates are highly salient, i.e. they are easily available and their effects are well-known to executives 
(Graham et al. 2015). Tax base effects, on the other hand, are more complex and their economic 
effects are less straightforward to comprehend (Blaufus et al. 2013). Based on these considerations, we 
conjecture that the choice between equity and debt financing is driven by the salience of statutory tax 
                                                            
4 For instance, decision makers often estimate the outcome of a decision based on some initial value (i.e. the 
anchor) that is adjusted to derive a solution. As they fail to adjust sufficiently, “different starting points yield 
different estimates” and decisions are biased towards the anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1128). 
5 Some scholars argue that organizational decision making is always economically optimal. In this respect, 
DellaVigna (2009) posits that firms have measures at hand to increase the optimality of their decisions which 
include, for instance, external consultants or feedback from the capital market. Others, however, acknowledge 
that corporate decision making could be biased if no feedback is provided to the decision maker (Camerer and 
Melmendier 2007). Given the complexity of tax planning, the specificity of information required to take tax 
planning decisions and the possibility to obscure relevant information in the financial statements (Balakrishnan, 
Blouin, and Guay 2011), the probability of identifying suboptimal decisions tends to be relatively low. 
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rates, as their economic effect on the group tax burden is institutive and easy to compute. A simplified 
decision strategy based on the salience of tax rate effects, however, potentially induces a decision bias 
if tax base changes do not receive adequate attention and decision makers underestimate their 
economic effects. Based on these considerations, we hypothesize the following: 
H1:  If (1) a tax rate differential and (2) a tax loss carry-forward determine the tax consequences 
of a tax planning decision, the decision is biased towards the tax rate effect. 
As heuristics accelerate decision processes, they are used not only if decision makers face 
complex situations, but also if resources for decision making are limited. Extensive decision making, 
on the contrary, requires time and cognitive effort, but leads to more accurate decisions (Kahneman 
2003, 2011). Previous research in psychology found that time pressure stimulates the use of heuristics 
where decision quality follows an inverted U-shaped curve and increases in moderate time pressure, 
while it decreases if stress levels become onerous (Rothstein 1986; Payne, Bettman, and Johnson 
1988; Dror, Busemeyer, and Basola 1999). Several studies in auditing research confirm the negative 
effects of time pressure on decision quality (e.g. Ponemon 1992; Choo 1995; Braun 2000; Low and 
Tan 2011). Accordingly, we conjecture that time pressure in tax planning scenarios increases the 
probability of reliance on heuristics based on the salience of statutory tax rates and posit the following: 
H2: Time pressure increases the decision bias in tax planning decisions. 
Apart from situational factors that affect decision making, personal experience tends to 
shape decision making. Tax planning decisions are complex tasks and require specialized knowledge. 
Hence, in a simple environment with perfect information, we expect subjects with work experience in 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, as well as advanced graduate students in these fields to perform 
better than subjects without relevant experience. Personally more experienced subjects could find it 
easier to identify the optimal solution to a problem, as they are familiar with the decision environment 
and have relevant knowledge of the topic. Therefore, we hypothesize the following: 
H3: Work experience or education in accounting, taxation, and/or finance increases the share of 
optimal tax planning decisions. 
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Finally, we investigate whether the decision strategy and the use of heuristics depend on the 
financial consequences of a tax planning strategy, i.e. the tax burden induced. As in some settings 
overall tax effects are large and therefore obvious, heuristics may not be applied to the same extent as 
in decisions with less clear outcomes. This is in line with models of rational inattention which suggest 
that information is rather considered if ignoring it is costly (Abeler and Jaeger 2015). In our case, this 
theory suggests that the probability of taking optimal decisions is related to the tax burden difference 
between the two tax planning strategies (equity or debt financing). If, for instance, equity yields a 
significantly lower group tax burden than debt, we expect a higher likelihood of choosing equity. If, 
however, the tax effects of equity or debt differ only marginally, we expect a smaller share of optimal 
decisions. In other words: the more obvious the tax advantage of debt or equity, the less heuristics are 
used in decision making. Based on these considerations, we conjecture: 
H4: An increase in the tax burden difference between equity and debt financing mitigates the 
decision bias in tax planning decisions. 
Figure 1 summarizes our research hypotheses and graphically depicts the theoretical framework 
underlying our experimental tests. 
<Insert Figure 1 about here> 
3. Research Design 
3.1. Experimental Setup 
An economic experiment allows us to isolate behavioral responses to changes in statutory tax 
rates (i.e. the tax rate differential) and the tax base (i.e. the tax loss carry-forward). We run a 
computer-based experiment programmed in Z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) with three stages: (i) a 
questionnaire, (ii) instructions for a tax planning game, and (iii) a set of 16 tax planning decisions. 
These are based on carefully constructed parameters which allow clustering the 16 decisions in 
different ways to achieve detailed insight for analysis. 
We simulate decision making under time pressure by randomly assigning 60% of our 
subjects to a treatment with limited decision time (time-pressure treatment). The remaining subjects 
- 11 - 
do not face time constraints (no-time-pressure treatment). Before conducting the experiment, we ran 
pre-tests with 18 junior faculty members and tracked the decision time. On average, it took pre-test 
participants 90 seconds to take one tax planning decision. As the time-pressure treatment aims at 
triggering rapid decision making and exploring an adaption of the decision strategy (Payne et al. 
1988), we restrict the time to 45 seconds per decision and introduce the time limitation immediately 
before the first tax planning decision (Low and Tan 2011). We do not force our subjects to provide a 
decision within the given time frame. Overall, this experimental setup yields a factorial design with 
between and within subject variation. 
3.2. Experimental Procedure6 
Questionnaire 
We initiate our study with a questionnaire on participants’ personal background, their work 
experience and education in accounting, taxation, and/or finance. Furthermore, we ask eight questions 
to identify personal attitudes towards debt financing. The questionnaire concludes with a test to 
measure reflexivity in individuals’ decision making (cognitive reflection test; see Frederick 2005).7 
Instructions 
In the second part of the experiment, we introduce our subjects to a tax planning game which 
consists of 16 intra-group financing decisions. The scenario describes a multinational that operates in 
two countries. While the parent company is located in country A, the subsidiary operates in country B. 
Subjects take the position of the multinational’s CFO and are in charge of intra-group financing 
provided by the parent company to the subsidiary. Financing arrangements can take the form of intra-
group equity or debt. We instruct participants to choose the form of financing which minimizes the 
total group tax burden in a one-period setting. 
After providing some background on taxes and financing decisions, we outline a simple tax 
system which comprises three dimensions:8 (i) the statutory tax rates τୟ, τୠ, (ii) the amount of tax loss 
                                                            
6 A copy of the experimental instrument is available on request.  
7 As we conduct our study in [language to be resolved], we apply a translated version of the cognitive reflection 
test provided by Piazolo (2007). 
8 Tax parameters are identical to the model derived in section 2.1. For a definition of the tax variables, see the 
respective section. 
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carry-forward Lୠ available at the subsidiary, and (iii) an asymmetric tax treatment of interest payments 
I and dividends. As we are interested in the trade-off between a positive tax rate differential and a tax 
loss carry-forward determined under (7), τୟ is strictly smaller than τୠ. Moreover, the subsidiary in 
country B reports a tax loss carry-forward Lୠ which can be offset against its taxable income. Any 
unused Lୠ will be forfeited in later periods.9 Equity and debt financing receive an asymmetric tax 
treatment where dividends are tax-exempt in country A, while debt financing triggers interest 
payments that are tax deductible at the subsidiary and taxable at the parent company. We also outline a 
simple economic environment where the parent company does not report any income besides interest 
or dividend payments received from the subsidiary. The subsidiary earns a constant profit of ECU 
4,000,00010 and fully distributes after-tax profits as dividends. Also, the financed amount (ECU 
50,000,000) and interest payments (ECU 3,000,000) do not vary. 
We integrate three safeguards to ensure that subjects understand the experimental task. First, 
we present a table summarizing all information and depicting how to compute the group tax burden, 
conditional on the form of intra-group financing. Based on that, we present two model calculations 
which comprise all relevant factors, i.e. the financed amount, interest payments, the taxable profit of 
the subsidiary, statutory tax rates, the tax loss carry-forward at the subsidiary, as well as the group tax 
burden which results from equity or debt financing. While one model calculation yields equity as the 
tax-minimizing solution, the other implies debt financing. Moreover, we explain the tax effects of both 
choices in written form. The third and final safeguard involves three questions (check questions) 
which cover the three dimensions of the tax system: (i) the effects of the tax rate differential, (ii) the 
effects of a tax loss carry-forward and (iii) the effects of asymmetric taxation of dividends and interest 
payments. To ensure that only participants who fully understand the general mechanism are included 
in the primary analysis, we exclude those who did not correctly solve the check questions.  
                                                            
9 This assumption is crucial to rule out timing and interest effects implied by shifting an existing tax loss carry-
forward to future periods. 
10 ECU (“Electronic Currency Unit”) is an abbreviation for a fictitious currency we introduce in the experimental 
testing.  
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Tax Planning Game 
The main part of our experiment consists of a tax planning game with 16 intra-group 
financing decisions. Every participant faces these 16 decisions in random order. At any time, 
participants may refer back to the general information and model calculation provided in the table 
described in the previous section. We also provide a calculator, paper, and a pencil to ensure perfect 
information throughout the experiment. However, subjects do not receive feedback on their decisions; 
i.e. we do not reveal whether they took tax-minimizing decisions until the end of the experiment. 
Based on the trade-off determined under (7), we systematically vary the tax-minimizing 
solution by changing (i) the statutory tax rates and (ii) the amount of tax loss carry-forward available 
at the subsidiary. We keep the remaining parameters constant, which enables us to determine the 
decision relevance of the tax rate effect (i.e. the tax rate differential) and the tax base effect (i.e. the tax 
loss carry-forward). Panel A of Table 2 presents the tax parameters for the 16 decisions (items). Eight 
items (items 5-8 and 13-16) yield equity as the tax-minimizing outcome. Debt financing is the optimal 
choice for the remaining items (items 1-4 and 9-12). We design eight item pairs where the tax burden 
difference between equity and debt financing is constant for each pair. For items 1 and 9, for instance, 
debt financing reduces the group tax burden by 200,000 ECU compared to equity. Vice versa, equity 
financing yields a 200,000 ECU smaller group tax burden for items 8 and 16. We vary the tax burden 
difference in a way that one option is clearly preferable for some items, while the difference is less 
pronounced for others. Items 1, 8, 9, and 16, for instance, result in a tax advantage of 200,000 ECU 
(delta200000) for the tax-minimizing choice, while the difference is reduced to roughly 1,280 ECU11 
(delta1280) for items 4, 5, 12, and 13. Items 3, 6, 11, and 14 yield a difference of 25,000 ECU 
(delta25000), and items 2, 7, 10, and 15 a difference of 60,000 ECU (delta60000). 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
As our paper aims at identifying unequal responses to tax rate and tax base effects, three item 
groups are particularly relevant (see Panel B of Table 2). Debt capital is the tax-minimizing choice in 
                                                            
11 Due to rounding difficulties in obtaining readable statutory tax rates, tax burden differences implied by equity 
or debt financing do not completely match for items 4, 5, 12, and 13 (i.e. delta1280). For the remaining item 
groups (delta25000, delta60000, and delta200000), the tax burden differences match. 
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the baseline item group (items 1 to 4). While the tax rate differential is constant within this group, the 
subsidiary’s tax loss carry-forward increases by the ordering of items, while the tax advantage of debt 
diminishes. Equity is the tax-minimizing choice in the changeTLCF item group (items 5 to 8) where 
the tax rate differential is identical to baseline, while the subsidiary’s tax loss carry-forward further 
increases. Therefore, the tax advantage of equity financing increases by the ordering of items. We 
posit under H1 that subjects are biased towards the tax base effect (i.e. the tax rate differential) and 
rather choose debt instead of tax-minimizing equity. Therefore, we expect a smaller share of tax-
minimizing choices in the changeTLCF group item compared to baseline. changeTD comprises items 
13 to 16 where equity financing is the tax-minimizing choice. While the tax rate differential is 
constant at a low level in this group, the tax loss carry-forward decreases by the ordering of items. For 
every item in this group, the tax-burden difference between equity and debt financing is identical to 
one item of the changeTLCF group so that, for instance, equity yields the same tax advantage for 
items 14 and 6 (see Panel A of Table 2). Again, we expect a smaller share of tax-optimal decisions in 
the changeTD item group compared to baseline, as the tax rate differential suggests debt financing 
while equity financing yields the tax-optimal choice. Debt capital is the tax-minimizing choice in the 
symmetry item group (items 9 to 12). While the tax rate differential is constant at a high level, the tax 
loss carry-forward decreases by the ordering of items. In such a case, we do not expect a smaller share 
of optimal choices compared to baseline, as the tax rate differential indicates debt financing (which is 
the tax-minimizing choice). We create the symmetry item group so that eight items yield debt and 
eight items yield equity financing as the tax-minimizing choice. 
3.3. Dependent Variable and Remuneration 
We ask our subjects to indicate the tax minimizing form of intra-group financing. Thus, they 
face 16 binary choices between equity and debt financing. For our analysis, every decision is recoded 
as one or zero, where one denotes a tax-minimizing decision while zero indicates otherwise. We 
provide monetary incentives for participation (Croson 2005) and pay subjects based on their 
performance in the tax planning game. Participants receive a show-up fee of [to be resolved] 6.00 and 
we reward tax-minimizing (i.e. economically optimal) choices with [to be resolved] 0.50 each. We do 
not remunerate decisions that failed to minimize the tax burden. For a total of 16 decisions, this 
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schedule yields an expected payoff of [to be resolved] 10.00 and a maximum of [to be resolved] 14.00 
per person.12 After every decision, we ask our subjects to indicate their confidence of having identified 
the tax-minimizing form of financing on a scale from 0 to 8. 
3.4. Sample 
Our sample comprises experienced students from a public business university in [to be 
resolved] with a background in business administration, business law, and/or economics. We invited 
all active students to participate via email, and personally recruited graduate students in accounting, 
taxation, and/or finance. These students have professional experience and a sound understanding of the 
topic. We conducted the experiment in the computer laboratory of the university in January 2015 and 
tested a total of 185 subjects in 11 sessions. Observations of 44 subjects are excluded from the primary 
analysis, as 40 did not pass the check questions and another 4 did not provide decisions for any of the 
16 items. As we do not require a full set of 16 decisions per subject, we include subjects who did not 
provide a decision on every item in our primary sample.13 These missing observations concern the 
time-pressure treatment where we did not force our subjects to take a decision within the given time 
frame. If no decision was taken within 45 seconds, the item was counted as unsolved and the next item 
was presented. However, by not taking a decision, participants forewent the opportunity to be 
compensated for that item.14 The final sample consists of 141 subjects and 2,024 decisions. Table 3 
provides an overview on the sample selection. 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Table 4 presents demographic data per treatment. 46.1% of the participants in the final 
sample are male and the average age is 25.1 years. The time-pressure treatment contains significantly 
more subjects with education in accounting, taxation, and/or finance (p = 0.06). Other than that, there 
is no significant difference between the two treatment groups. On average, a session without time 
pressure lasted approximately one hour, and a time pressure session around 45 minutes. Accordingly, 
                                                            
12 We expect a payoff of [to be resolved] 10 if participants guess throughout the experiment. This is true, as a 
binary choice implies a 50% chance to randomly select the optimal solution. 
13 As a robustness check, we limit our sample to subjects who provided decisions on all 16 items. The results 
presented in section 4.6. do not differ qualitatively from the primary analysis. 
14 We do not observe a systematic distribution of missing observations across items (X² = 0.932, df = 15, p > 
0.999). Thus, missing observations are randomly distributed and not driven by the perceived subjective difficulty 
of certain items. 
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the average payoff in the time-pressure treatment ([to be resolved] 10.76) amounts to about 75% of the 
payoff in the no-time-pressure treatment ([to be resolved] 12.82). Within a session, participants were 
neither allowed to leave the laboratory nor provided with feedback on their performance until the last 
session participant had finished the task. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5 presents the distribution of tax-minimizing decisions across our treatments. We find 
that 18.4% of our subjects provide tax-minimizing solutions to all 16 items, which yields an average 
share of 68.8% tax-minimizing decisions per subject (SD = 0.23). Not surprisingly, t-tests indicate a 
significant difference from the optimum of 100% correct decisions per subject (t = -16.04, p < 0.001 
(one-tailed)). The result holds for the no-time-pressure treatment, where roughly 40% of the subjects 
provide a full set of tax-minimizing decisions. The average share of 83.9% tax-minimizing decisions 
per subject (SD = 0.20) is significantly smaller than the optimum of 100% (t = -6.35, p < 0.001 (one-
tailed)). Similarly, the average share of 58.0% tax-minimizing decisions per subject (SD = 0.19) in the 
time-pressure treatment is again significantly smaller than the optimum (t = -19.93, p < 0.001 (one-
tailed)). If participants were to have systematically guessed, we would expect a share of 50% tax-
minimizing choices. Yet, the average share of tax-minimizing decisions per subject is significantly 
larger than 50% (t = 9.68, p < 0.001 (one-tailed)). This result holds for the no-time-pressure treatment 
(t = 13.34, p < 0.001 (one-tailed)) and the time-pressure treatment (t= 3.79, p < 0.001 (one-tailed)).15 
Table 5 also indicates that the average share of tax-minimizing decisions is significantly larger for the 
no-time-pressure treatment compared to the time-pressure treatment (t = 7.87, p < 0.001 (one-
                                                            
15 Our results hold if the sample is limited to subjects who provided a full set of 16 decisions (untabulated). The 
average share of tax-minimizing decisions per subject equals 12.43 (SD = 3.43), which is significantly less than 
16 (t = –9.24, p < 0.001 (one-tailed)) and significantly more than 8 (t = 11.47, p = < 0.001 (one-tailed)). For the 
no-time-pressure [time pressure] subsample, the average share of tax-minimizing decisions per subject equals 
13.63 [9.52] (SD = 3.07; [SD = 2.39]) which is significantly less than 16 (t = –5.79, p < 0.001 (one-tailed); [t = –
13.00, p < 0.001 (one-tailed)]) and significantly more than 8 (t = 13.70, p < 0.001 (one-tailed); [t = 3.05, p < 0.01 
(one-tailed)]). 
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tailed)).16 While almost 40% of the subjects in the no-time-pressure treatment consistently make tax-
minimizing decisions, only 5% do so under time pressure. Overall, these results imply that subjects do 
not always take tax-minimizing decisions and that time pressure negatively affects decision quality. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
4.2. Salience of Statutory Tax Rates and Biases in Tax Planning Decisions 
Under H1, we conjecture that biases in tax planning decisions are not randomly distributed, 
but a result of heuristics based on salient pieces of information (i.e. the tax rate differential). We 
investigate this hypothesis by clustering the 16 items into item groups baseline, changeTCLF, 
changeTD, and symmetry. As shown in Table 6, we observe the largest share of tax-minimizing 
decisions in baseline, while the share is significantly smaller in changeTLCF and changeTD. To 
investigate the effect of a variation in the tax parameters on decision making while controlling for the 
experimental treatment and personal characteristics of the subject, we estimate the following logistic 
regression model for decision i of subject j: 
 ln ୔౪౗౮షౣ౟౤౟ౣ౟౰౟౤ౝ	ౚ౛ౙ౟౩౟౥౤ଵି୔౪౗౮షౣ౟౤౟ౣ౟౰౟౤ౝ	ౚ౛ౙ౟౩౟౥౤୧,୨ ൌ 	α ൅ βଶchangeTLCF ൅ βଷchangeTD ൅ βସsymmetry ൅
	βହTreatment ൅ 	β∑X୨ ൅ ε, (8) 
where P୲ୟ୶ି୫୧୬୧୫୧୸୧୬୥	ୢୣୡ୧ୱ୧୭୬୧,୨ ൌ
ୣሺಉశಊమౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ైిూశಊయౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ీశಊర౩౯ౣౣ౛౪౨౯శ	ಊఱ౐౨౛౗౪ౣ౛౤౪శ	ಊ∑౔ౠశ಍ሻ
ଵା	ୣሺಉశಊమౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ైిూశಊయౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ీశಊర౩౯ౣౣ౛౪౨౯శ	ಊఱ౐౨౛౗౪ౣ౛౤౪శ	ಊ∑౔ౠశ಍ሻ 
denotes the probability that subject j takes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. 
changeTLCF, changeTD, and symmetry are indicator variables with the value of one if the 
decision belongs to the respective item group, and zero otherwise. α captures the natural logarithm of 
the odds ratio to take a tax-minimizing decision in the baseline item group. The coefficients for the 
indicator variables denote the incremental change in the odds ratio due to a variation in the item group. 
Treatment is an indicator variable which takes on the value of one if the subject belongs to the time-
                                                            
16 If we limit our sample to subjects providing decisions on all 16 items, the average share of tax-minimizing 
decisions per subject is again significantly smaller under time pressure (t = 5.73, p < 0.001). 
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pressure treatment, and zero otherwise. Vector X୨ includes control variables for subject j’s personal 
characteristics (i.e. gender, work experience, education, cognitive reflexivity, and age).17 
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
Regression results depicted under column (1) in Table 7 indicate that, compared to baseline, 
the probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision is significantly lower for changeTLCF (by 14.8 
percentage points) and changeTD (by 10.9 percentage points) items. Thus, decision making in the tax 
planning game seems to be driven by statutory tax rates where the positive tax rate differential points 
in the direction of debt financing for changeTLCF and changeTD items, while the size of the tax loss 
carry-forward causes equity financing to be tax beneficial. This unequal response to tax rate and tax 
base effects in the decision making process indicate a significant decision bias. As expected, we do not 
observe significantly different decision patterns for baseline and symmetry items. Moreover, we do not 
find an effect of personal characteristics (such as education, work experience, gender, age, and 
cognitive reflexivity) on the probability of taking tax-minimizing decisions. 
4.3. Time Pressure and Biases in Tax Planning Decisions 
Under H2, we conjecture that time pressure increases the propensity towards decisions 
biases, as it urges decision makers to rely on heuristics. Under column (1) in Table 7, we find that time 
pressure negatively affects the general probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision (by 25.3 
percentage points), which indicates that time pressure has an overall negative effect on decision 
quality. To investigate the impact of time pressure on the decision bias, we re-estimate the previous 
regression for each experimental treatment. Results shown under columns (2) and (3) in Table 7 
suggest that the decision bias exclusively occurs in the time-pressure treatment, where a decision from 
the changeTLCF item group reduces the probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision by a 
significant 26.6 percentage points compared to baseline. The coefficient for changeTD renders 
negative, as well, which indicates that participants systematically underestimate tax base effects. 
Without time pressure, neither changes in the tax loss carry-forward (changeTLCF) nor changes in the 
tax rate differential (changeTD) significantly affect the probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision 
                                                            
17 A definition of variables is provided in Appendix A. 
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(column (3) in Table 7). Under column (4), we interact our item groups with treatment and retain the 
full sample. As expected, the interactions changeTLCF*Treatment and changeTD*Treatment yield 
significant coefficients. In terms of personal characteristics, we find that education increases the 
general probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision in the absence of time pressure. Overall, our 
results support H1 and H2: Tax planning decisions are biased towards the salient tax rate effect. 
Decision makers apply these heuristics more frequently when facing time pressure. 
<Insert Table 7 about here> 
4.4. Personal Experience and Biases in Tax Planning Decisions 
We conjecture under H3 that the propensity towards decision biases in tax planning 
decisions depends on the personal experience of the decision maker. To investigate this hypothesis, we 
explore the personal characteristics of our subjects and define personal experience as (i) work 
experience in accounting, taxation, and/or finance or (ii) education in a specialized graduate program. 
Given our sample and to achieve a more nuanced analysis, we subdivide work experience into 
moderate (less than 6 months) and advanced work experience (more than six months). 25.5% of our 
subjects have moderate work experience while 21.3% show advanced work experience. 27.0% of our 
subjects study in a specialized graduate program. Univariate results in Table 8 indicate that subjects 
with work experience (Panel A) or education (Panel B) do not make a larger share of tax-minimizing 
choices than subjects without personal experience in accounting, taxation, and/or finance. Under time 
pressure, subjects with moderate or advanced work experience take significantly less tax-minimizing 
decisions in the changeTLCF item group. To further investigate the effect of personal experience on 
the decision bias, we modify regression (8) as follows: 
 ln ୔౪౗౮షౣ౟౤౟ౣ౟౰౟౤ౝ	ౚ౛ౙ౟౩౟౥౤ଵି୔౪౗౮షౣ౟౤౟ౣ౟౰౟౤ౝ	ౚ౛ౙ౟౩౟౥౤୧,୨ ൌ 	α ൅ βଶchangeTLCF ൅ βଷchangeTD ൅ βସsymmetry ൅
βହchangeTLCF ∗ ∑EXPERIENCE୨ ൅ β଺changeTD ∗
∑EXPERIENCE୨ ൅ β଻symmetry ∗ ∑EXPERIENCE୨ ൅
	β଼Treatment ൅ 	β∑X୨ ൅ ε, (9) 
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where P୲ୟ୶ି୫୧୬୧୫୧୸୧୬୥	ୢୣୡ୧ୱ୧୭୬୧,୨ ൌ
ୣሺಉశಊమౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ైిూశಊయౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ీశಊర౩౯ౣౣ౛౪౨౯	శሾ… ሿሻ
ଵା	ୣሺಉశಊమౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ైిూశಊయౙ౞౗౤ౝ౛౐ీశಊర౩౯ౣౣ౛౪౨౯	శሾ… ሿሻ 
denotes the probability that subject j takes a tax-minimizing decision in item i. 
EXPERIENCE୨ captures personal experience and includes indicator variables for moderate 
and advanced work experience, as well as education. α is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio to 
take a tax-minimizing decision in the baseline item group if subject j does not have personal 
experience. βହ, β଺, and β଻ denote the incremental effect of changeTLCF, changeTD and symmetry 
items, conditional on personal experience. Treatment and the remaining control variables are in line 
with regression (8). 
<Insert Table 8 about here> 
We present regression results in columns (1) to (6) of Table 10. Columns (1) and (4) 
comprise the full sample; (2) and (5) the time-pressure treatment; and (3) and (6) the no-time-pressure 
treatment. In line with our univariate results, the interaction terms between item groups and personal 
experience (e.g. changeTLCF*Moderate Work Experience) reveal that work experience or education 
do not imply a higher probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision in changeTLCF and changeTD 
item groups. The only significant positive effect of advanced work experience on the probability of 
taking a tax-minimizing decision concerns the changeTCLF item group in the no-time-pressure 
treatment. Contrary to our hypothesis, we find that, under time pressure, moderate work experience 
tends to reinforce the decision bias for changeTLCF and changeTD items. Our estimation reveals a 
reduction in optimal choices by 22.0 percentage points for changeTLCF and by 19.4 percentage points 
for changeTD items. Thus, for decision makers with a moderate level of work experience, the 
probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision in these item groups decreases significantly, while the 
effect is not significant for decision makers with an advanced degree of work experience. Overall, 
these results do not support H3: The decision bias in tax planning decisions identified under H1 and 
H2 is largely independent from personal experience as defined above. In fact, somewhat experienced 
decision makers tend to apply heuristics to a similar degree as decision makers without experience. 
- 21 - 
Overconfidence 
When contrasting the relation between personal characteristics and the probability of taking 
a tax-minimizing decision with univariate results in Table 8, we find some evidence for an 
overconfidence bias in subjects with moderate work experience. These subjects indicate a higher 
confidence of having identified the tax-minimizing choice for changeTLCF and changeTD items 
compared to subjects without personal experience (see mean of indicated confidence in Table 8). At 
the same time, subjects with moderate work experience exhibit a significantly larger decision bias in 
the time-pressure treatment. Such a pattern suggests that decision makers with some work experience 
in accounting, taxation, and/or finance tend to overestimate their abilities – which reinforces the 
decision bias. A similar conclusion, however, is not possible for subjects with advanced work 
experience or education. 
4.5. The Mitigating Effect of Tax Burden Differences in Tax Planning Decisions 
We posit under H4 that the probability to take biased tax planning decisions depends on the 
tax effects of the available strategies. To test our final hypothesis, we evaluate the effects of tax burden 
differences which range from 1,280 ECU to 200,000 ECU (see Panel B of Table 2) on the probability 
of taking a tax-minimizing decision. Univariate results in Table 9 suggest that the share of tax-
minimizing decisions is lowest for items with the smallest tax burden difference (Delta1280), and 
increases along the tax burden difference in the changeTLCF item group. However, we do not find a 
consistent pattern for the changeTD item group. To investigate our hypothesis in a multivariate setting, 
we modify regression (8) as follows: 
 ln ୔౪౗౮షౣ౟౤౟ౣ౟౰౟౤ౝ	ౚ౛ౙ౟౩౟౥౤ଵି୔౪౗౮షౣ౟౤౟ౣ౟౰౟౤ౝ	ౚ౛ౙ౟౩౟౥౤୧,୨ ൌ 			α	 ൅ 	βଶdelta25000 ൅ βଷdelta60000		 ൅ 	βସdelta200000 ൅
	βହTreatment ൅ 	β∑X୨ ൅ ε, (10) 
where P୲ୟ୶ି୫୧୬୧୫୧୸୧୬୥	ୢୣୡ୧ୱ୧୭୬୧,୨ ൌ
ୣሺಉశಊమౚ౛ౢ౪౗మఱబబబశಊయౚ౛ౢ౪౗లబబబబశಊరౚ౛ౢ౪౗మబబబబబ	శಊఱ౐౨౛౗౪ౣ౛౤౪శ	ಊ∑౔ౠశ಍ሻ
ଵା	ୣሺಉశಊమౚ౛ౢ౪౗మఱబబబశಊయౚ౛ౢ౪౗లబబబబశಊరౚ౛ౢ౪౗మబబబబబ	శಊఱ౐౨౛౗౪ౣ౛౤౪శ	ಊ∑౔ౠశ಍ሻ 
denotes the probability of taking a tax-minimizing decision under item i. 
delta25000, delta60000, and delta200000 are indicator variables which take on the value of 
one if the decision belongs to the respective item group, and zero otherwise. α captures the natural 
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logarithm of the odds ratio to take a tax-minimizing decision for the item with the smallest tax burden 
difference (delta1280). Coefficients 	βଶ, 	βଷ, and 	βସ indicate the incremental change in the odds ratio 
to take a tax-minimizing decision due to a variation in the tax burden difference. Treatment and vector 
X୨ are identical to regression (8). 
We present regression results under columns (7) to (12) in Table 10. Columns (7) to (9) 
include observations from the changeTLCF item group, while columns (10) to (12) comprise 
observations from the changeTD item group. Coefficient estimates for the indicator variables denote 
that within the changeTLCF item group, a delta200000 item increases the probability of taking a tax-
minimizing decision by a significant 15.5 percentage points compared to a delta1280 item. Thus, the 
decision bias is weakly mitigated by an increasing tax burden difference. In contrast to the tax rate 
bias, this finding also holds for the no-time-pressure treatment. However, we do not find a mitigating 
effect for changeTD items (columns (10) to (12)). The remaining results are in line with our previous 
analysis where treatment significantly reduces the general probability of taking a tax-minimizing 
decision for both item groups. Overall, our results partly confirm H4: An increase in the tax burden 
difference between debt and equity financing weakly mitigates the decision bias. 
<Insert Table 9 about here> 
4.6. Supplementary Tests 
To provide evidence for the robustness of our main findings and to rule out alternative 
explanations, we conduct additional tests and report results in Table 11. Specifically, we rerun column 
(1) in Table 7 on a modified sample. As a first step, we drop all subjects who did not pass the check 
questions and did not provide decisions for all 16 items. This step reduces our sample to 79 subjects 
(column (1) in Table 11). Although coefficient estimates are smaller, results remain qualitatively 
similar to our main findings. changeTD does not render significantly negative, while the coefficient 
for changeTLCF is still significantly less than zero. In a second step, we drop the requirement of 
correct check questions – which extends the initial sample to any observation, irrespective of whether 
these questions were answered correctly. This step yields a sample of 181 subjects (see column (2) in 
Table 11). Similarly, we obtain significant negative coefficients for both changeTLCF and changeTD. 
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These tests support our main finding that subjects tend to apply heuristics based on the salience of the 
tax rate effect. The decision bias induced by a large tax rate differential seems to be particularly stable 
and does not depend on the sampling procedure. Interestingly, CRT, which captures the outcome of the 
cognitive reflection test, renders a positive coefficient under column (2) in Table 11. As its coefficient 
is insignificant in the primary analysis, subjects with a low degree of reflexivity in decision making 
appear to have failed the check questions. This result increases our confidence that subjects who did 
not comprehend the experimental task are excluded from the primary analysis, and that the decision 
bias does not emerge from a lack of understanding. Moreover, we test whether our results could be 
driven by the distribution underlying our regression models, and replace the logistic regression 
estimated under column (1) in Table 7 with a probit model.18 Results are similar to those of the 
primary analysis (see column (3) in Table 11). 
<Insert Table 10 about here> 
Personal Attitude towards Debt Financing 
In additional tests (untabulated), we investigate whether personal attitudes towards debt 
financing could drive our results and explain the significant share of debt choices in changeTLCF and 
changeTD items. Based on eight questions presented in the questionnaire (scale from 0-8), where four 
concern the debtor side and four the lender side of debt financing, we construct two measures to proxy 
for these attitudes. Both scales comprise four questions, where higher values indicate a higher 
propensity towards debt financing. We estimate an OLS regression with the share of debt choices per 
subject as a dependent variable and the debt-attitudes scales as well as the controls from regression (8) 
as independent variables.19 Our results suggest no significant effect of either the debtor side (mean = 
3.23, t = 0.09, p = 0.932 (one-tailed)) or the lender side scale (mean = 2.69, t = -0.68, p = 0.496 (one-
tailed)) on the share of debt choices. Thus, we are confident that personal attitudes towards debt 
financing do not affect our results and our subjects are not driven by a general debt preference. 
                                                            
18 Both models apply a maximum likelihood method to estimate coefficients. Logit models assume a logistic 
distribution (logit-transformation), while probit models assume a normal distribution (probit-transformation). 
19 A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test does not yield significant differences between our experimental treatments in 
terms of the debtor side (z = 0.289, p = 0.773) and the lender side (z = –0.157, p = 0.875) scale. 
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5. Discussion 
This paper experimentally investigates behavioral aspects of tax planning. Our results 
suggest that tax planning decisions, under certain conditions, could be systematically biased, as 
participants consider tax rates effects more carefully while they underestimate tax base changes. Such 
a behavior leads to a substantial share of economically suboptimal tax planning decisions. In line with 
recent experimental and empirical evidence by Blaufus et al. (2013), Graham et al. (2015), and Powers 
et al. (2015), we attribute these results to the use of heuristics, which simplify decision making but 
increase the share of economically suboptimal choices. Previous research found that salient 
information drives decision behavior (Chetty et al. 2009) where tax rate effects appear more salient to 
decision makers than the effects of tax loss carry-forwards. Similarly, taxpayers could find it easier to 
evaluate the economic consequences of tax rate changes relative to changes in the tax base. This is 
true, as tax rate changes are often subject to policy debates and the media primarily refer to tax rate 
changes when discussing the consequences of tax reforms. Hence, strong public scrutiny of tax rate 
changes could imply a better understanding of their economic consequences which potentially lead 
participants to consider tax rates more carefully in their decisions. 
While our subjects do not take systematically biased decisions if decision time is unlimited, 
time pressure as a proxy for resource constraints significantly intensifies the decision bias. This is true, 
as the likelihood to rely on heuristics decreases if subjects are able to reflect extensively on their 
decisions. Our finding is in line with studies that document an impact of the decision environment on 
the susceptibility to apply heuristics and the magnitude of a decision bias (Rothstein 1986; Payne et al. 
1988; Dror et al. 1999). Under resource constraints, decision biases are largely independent from 
personal work experience or education. However, subjects with moderate work experience of up to six 
months are more confident about their decisions, but exhibit greater decision biases than subjects 
without work experience in accounting, taxation, and/or finance. Regarding the effect of tax burden 
differences on decision making, we find some support for the theory of rational inattention (Abeler 
and Jaeger 2015). Absent a significant tax burden difference between two available tax planning 
strategies, decision makers ignore relevant information and tend to apply heuristics. However, the 
share of tax-minimizing decisions increases in the tax burden difference between two options. 
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In exploring the behavioral dimension of tax planning, this paper offers several implications. 
In light of recent research, our findings add to the understanding of the heterogeneity in firms’ tax 
status and the undersheltering puzzle (Dyreng et al. 2008; Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). In particular, 
our results indicate that tax planning decisions could be less optimal than theoretically assumed, as 
decision makers overestimate the effects of salient information such as statutory tax rates. Such an 
effect is in line with recent research by Graham et al. (2015), who report substantial financial losses 
for firms due to simplified decision making. 
Although we do not exclusively investigate tax professionals, our results offer implications 
for corporate decision making. While shareholder scrutiny is assumed to rule out suboptimal decisions 
in public firms (DellaVigna 2009), lacking feedback for decision makers could facilitate biased 
decision making (Camerer and Malmendier 2007). Non-disclosure of tax planning schemes in 
financial statements, for instance, may hinder the evaluation of tax planning decisions. The same is 
true for tax audits, which could reveal overly aggressive tax planning structures while decision makers 
do not receive feedback on tax planning schemes which fail to minimize a firm’s tax burden. In light 
of the large proportion of U.S. firms paying taxes in excess of the 35% statutory tax rate (Dyreng et al. 
2008), our results suggest that managers and stakeholders should be aware of systematic decision 
biases when evaluating tax planning schemes or strategies. 
Furthermore, corporate decision making is regularly affected by resource constraints, such as 
strict time limits or budget restrictions. Such an environment exacerbates the collection of decision-
relevant information and facilitates the application of heuristics. The propensity to apply heuristics 
could, for instance, increase if a tax planning decision is taken by an executive who neither is familiar 
with the decision framework evaluated by the tax department nor receives sufficient internal 
information from the respective department (Gallemore and Labro 2015). An overrepresentation of 
salient information may cause decision biases leading to financial losses and negative effects on a 
firm’s competitiveness, investments and growth. Along the same lines, an overconfidence bias in 
subjects with some work experience in accounting, taxation, and/or finance could facilitate 
economically suboptimal tax planning. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) support this 
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conclusion, as they find that overconfidence of executives translates into more aggressive but less 
optimal corporate behavior. 
Finally, our results suggest that the increasing complexity of tax rules and the difficulty to 
comprehend their economic effects, foster decision making based on heuristics (Rupert, Single and 
Wright 2003). Such a behavior seems plausible, as overly complicated tax rules tend to require 
simplified decision strategies which result in economically suboptimal decisions and, for instance, lead 
to a misallocation of resources. In this respect, our results offer a behavioral explanation for the fact 
that tax revenues in industrialized countries did not decline in response to recent tax rate cutting and 
base broadening actions (Carone, Schmidt, and Nicodeme 2007). This is true, as corporate taxpayers 
may have underestimated tax base effects and insufficiently adapted their tax planning strategies. 
Findings from the laboratory are sometimes criticized for their lack of external validity as the 
complexity of real-life decisions is difficult to model in a laboratory setting. With regard to the present 
study, tax executives and advanced students could differ in the way they approach tax planning tasks. 
Although we are unable to investigate decision making among senior executives with several years of 
work experience, a significant share of our participants has work experience or relevant graduate 
education in the fields of accounting, taxation, and/or finance. Moreover, there is ample evidence that 
students’ decision making does not systematically deviate from professionals in accounting and 
management (Ashton and Kramer 1980; Remus 1996; Depositario, Nayga, Wu, and Laude 2009; 
Liyanarachchi 2007). Similarly, Elliot, Hodge, Kennedy, and Pronk (2007) show that investment 
decisions by students are valid if, like in the present case, the integrative complexity of an 
experimental task is rather low. 
While laboratory experiments offer valuable insights into the behavioral dimension of tax 
planning decisions, we are unable to model all aspects of decision making. In practice, a variety of 
factors affect decisions, including external consultants, liquidity aspects, risk considerations and 
accounting consequences. These factors, together with a manager’s incentives (e.g. compensation), 
could influence tax planning decisions. As we are interested in exploring the role of tax rate and tax 
base effects, we abstract from these dimensions. Nonetheless, we fully acknowledge their relevance 
for decision makers and leave their consideration in tax planning decisions for future research. 
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Appendix A:  Definition of variables 
Variable Definition 
Age Discrete variable capturing the age of subject j. 
baseline 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the baseline item group (items 1-4), and 
zero otherwise. 
changeTD 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the changeTD item group (items 13-
16), and zero otherwise. 
changeTLCF 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the changeTLCF item group (items 5-
8), and zero otherwise. 
CRT 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j 
has correctly solved all three questions of the cognitive 
reflection test based on Frederick (2005), and zero 
otherwise. 
delta1280 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the Delta1280 item group (items 4, 5, 
12, and 13), and zero otherwise. 
delta25000 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the Delta25000 item group (items 3, 6, 
11, and 14), and zero otherwise. 
delta60000 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the Delta60000 item group (items 2, 7, 
10, and 15), and zero otherwise. 
delta200000 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the Delta200000 item group (items 1, 
8, 9, and 16), and zero otherwise. 
Education 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j 
is studying in a program with a specific focus on 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance. 
Advanced Work Experience 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j 
has more than six months of work experience in the area of 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, and zero otherwise. 
Male Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j indicated to be male, and zero otherwise. 
Moderate Work Experience 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j 
has less than six months of work experience in the area of 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, and zero otherwise. 
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symmetry  
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if a 
decision stems from the symmetry item group (items 9-12), 
and zero otherwise. 
Treatment 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j 
was allocated to the time-pressure treatment, and zero 
otherwise. 
Work Experience 
Dummy variable which takes on the value of one if subject j 
has at least one month of work experience in the area of 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, and zero otherwise. 
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Appendix B:  Figures and tables 
Figure 1:  Theoretical framework and summary of hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This figure depicts our theoretical framework and summarizes the hypotheses. Under H1, we investigate whether 
tax-related information is disentangled in tax planning decisions. H2 examines the effect of time pressure, and H3 the effect 
of education and work experience on tax planning decisions. H4 investigates the influence of tax burden differences. 
  
Tax Related Information 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 
Tax Rate Differential 
Rational Inattention 
Tax Burden Difference 
H4 
Resource Constraints 
Time Pressure 
Tax Planning Decision 
Equity/Debt Financing 
H2 
H1 
Personal Experience 
Work Experience and Education 
H3 
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Table 1:  Summary of tax preferences for intra-group financing 
Tax loss carry-
forward Factor θ Tax rate differential Tax preference 
Lୠ ൑ 	 ሺπୠ െ Iሻ 1 d < 0 Equity 
Lୠ ൑ 	 ሺπୠ െ Iሻ 1 d = 0 Indifference 
Lୠ ൑ 	 ሺπୠ െ Iሻ 1 d > 0 Debt 
Lୠ ൐ 	 ሺπୠ െ Iሻ ሺπୠ െ Iሻ/Lୠ d ≤ 0 Equity 
Lୠ ൐ 	 ሺπୠ െ Iሻ ሺπୠ െ Iሻ/Lୠ d > 0 Dependent on  d and Lୠ 
Note: This table presents tax preferences for intra-group financing. θ denotes the fraction of the tax loss 
carry-forward which can be offset against taxable profits after the deduction of interest payments	I. πୠ 
describes the income of the subsidiary before deducting interest payments on intra-group debt and a tax loss 
carry-forward. I captures interest payments on intra-group debt provided by the parent company. Lୠ denotes 
the amount of tax loss carry-forward available at the subsidiary. d refers to the tax rate differential (i.e. the 
difference in statutory tax rates) between the subsidiary and the parent company. 
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Table 2:  Definition of items and item groups 
Panel A:  Tax parameters per item 
  
Item 9
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.388 
Tax Rate Parent 0.0368 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 3,200,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +200,000 
Item 1
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,400,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +200,000 
Item 10
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5175 
Tax Rate Parent 0.1663 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,920,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +60,000 
Item 11
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.556 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2048 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,850,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +25,000 
Item 2
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,680,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +60,000 
Item 3
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,750,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +25,000 
Item 12
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5838 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2326 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,802,570 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +1,260 
Item 4
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,797,430 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity +1,285 
Item 13
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.201 
Tax Rate Parent 0.081 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,797,430 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -1,283 
Item 14
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.22 
Tax Rate Parent 0.1 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,750,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -25,000 
Item 5
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,802,570 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -1,285 
Item 6
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,850,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -25.000 
Item 15
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.25 
Tax Rate Parent 0.13 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,680,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -60,000 
Item 16
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.4 
Tax Rate Parent 0.28 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,400,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -200,000 
Item 7
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 2,920,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -60,000 
Item 8
Tax Rate Subsidiary 0.5 
Tax Rate Parent 0.2 
Tax Loss Carry-Forward 3,200,000 
Δ Group Tax Burden from Equity -200.000 
- 36 - 
Panel B:  Tax parameters per item group 
Item group  Baseline ChangeTLCF ChangeTD Symmetry 
Items 1, 2, 3, 4 5, 6, 7, 8 13, 14, 15, 16 9, 10, 11, 12 
Tax loss carry-forward increasing increasing decreasing decreasing 
Tax rate differential high high low high 
Tax-minimizing choice debt equity equity debt 
Item group Delta1280 Delta25000 Delta60000 Delta200000 
Items 4, 5, 12, 13 3, 6, 11, 14 2, 7, 10, 15 1, 8, 9, 16 
Tax burden difference  
between tax-minimizing and 
suboptimal choice 
1,280 ECU 25,000 ECU 60,000 ECU 200,000 ECU 
Note: This table presents the 16 items used in the experimental testing (Panel A) as well as the item groups and their 
main properties (Panel B). Items denote the item numbers used in Panel A. 
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Table 3:  Sample selection 
Panel A:  Sample selection: subject basis 
Treatment Time Pressure No Time Pressure Full Sample
N Total Sample 108 77 185 
Check Questions Failed -22 -18 -40 
No Decisions Taken -4 0 -4 
N Final Sample 82 59 141 
 
Panel B:  Sample selection: item basis 
Treatment Time Pressure No Time Pressure Full Sample
N Total Decisions (hypothetical) 1,728 1,232 2,960 
Check Questions Failed -352 -288 -640 
Missing Observations -293 -3 -296 
N Final Sample 1,083 941 2,024 
Note: This table shows the sample selection procedure on subject (Panel A) and item basis (Panel B). Total Decisions 
(hypothetical) denotes the hypothetical number of decisions if every participant would have taken 16 tax planning decisions. 
Tax planning decisions are excluded from the primary analysis if the subject failed to correctly answer the check questions 
(Check Questions Failed). Additionally, observations are excluded if the subject did not provide at least one tax planning 
decision (Missing Observations). 
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Table 4:  Demographic data 
Treatment 
Variable 
Time Pressure 
(N=82) 
No Time Pressure 
(N=59) 
Difference 
p-Value 
Full Sample  
(N=141) 
Male 42.68% 50.85% 0.337 46.10% 
Age 25.15 (5.82) 
25.00 
(4.86) 0.898 
25.09 
(5.42) 
Education 32.93% 18.64% 0.059* 26.95% 
Work Experience 46.34% 47.46% 0.896 46.81% 
CRT 1.49 (1.22) 
1.44 
(1.18) 0.799 
1.47 
(1.20) 
Note: This table presents demographic data per experimental treatment. Male describes the share of male participants. Age 
displays mean age. Education covers the share of participants that study in a program with a specific focus on accounting, 
taxation, and/or finance. Work Experience describes the share of participants that have more than 1 month of work experience 
in the field of accounting, taxation and/or finance. CRT indicates the mean score of the cognitive reflection test (Frederick 
2005; scale: 0-3). Standard deviations are provided in parentheses. A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is applied on ordinal or 
interval variables (Age), while a Chi²-Test is applied on categorical variables (Male, Education, Work Experience, and CRT). 
***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 5:  Summary statistics: Share of tax-minimizing decisions across treatments 
Descriptives 
 
Sample 
Number of 
Decisions 
Share of Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Difference p-Value Standard Deviation Min Max 
25th 
Percentile Median 
75th 
Percentile 
Time Pressure 1,083 0.580 
0.259*** < 0.001 
0.191 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.563 0.692 
No Time Pressure 941 0.839 0.195 0.313 1.000 0.688 0.938 1.000 
Full Sample 2,024 0.688   0.231 0.000 1.000 0.500 0.688 0.938 
Note: This table presents the distribution of tax-minimizing decisions across treatments. A two-sample t-test is performed to compare means between the time-pressure and no-time-pressure 
treatments. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 6: Summary statistics: Share of tax-minimizing decisions per item group 
Treatment 
 
 
Item group  
Time Pressure No Time Pressure Difference p-Value Full Sample 
Share of Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Share of tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
 Share of Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Baseline 0.715 0.843 -0.127*** < 0.001 0.774 
ChangeTLCF 0.441 0.835 -0.394*** < 0.001 0.624 
Difference 0.274*** 0.008   0.150*** 
p-Value < 0.001 0.409   < 0.001 
      
Baseline 0.715 0.843 -0.127*** < 0.001 0.774 
ChangeTD 0.515 0.843 -0.328*** < 0.001 0.667 
Difference 0.200*** 0.000   0.107*** 
p-Value < 0.001 0.500   < 0.001 
      
Baseline 0.715 0.843 -0.127*** < 0.001 0.774 
Symmetry 0.679 0.838 -0.159*** < 0.001 0.754 
Difference 0.036 0.004   0.020 
p-Value 0.181 0.450   0.227 
Note: This table presents the average share of tax-minimizing decisions per item group. A two-sample t-test is 
performed to compare means. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-
tailed). 
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Table 7:  Primary regression results for H1 and H2 
Tax Minimizing  
Decision 
Full 
Sample 
(1) 
Time 
Pressure 
(2) 
No Time 
Pressure 
(3) 
Full 
Sample  
(4) 
Constant 1.939*** (0.356) 
0.645** 
(0.282) 
1.705*** 
(0.543) 
1.536*** 
(0.377) 
changeTLCF 
-0.795*** 
(0.216) 
[-0.148] 
-1.162*** 
(0.271) 
[-0.266] 
-0.058 
(0.354) 
[-0.008] 
-0.057 
(0.342) 
[-0.149] 
changeTD 
-0.585*** 
(0.192) 
[-0.109] 
-0.862*** 
(0.222) 
[-0.197] 
-0.003 
(0.348) 
[-0.001] 
-0.001 
(0.338) 
[-0.106] 
symmetry  
-0.135 
(0.134) 
[-0.025] 
-0.173 
(0.171) 
[-0.039] 
-0.033 
(0.185) 
[-0.004] 
-0.032 
(0.179) 
[-0.024] 
changeTLCF*Treatment    
-1.110** 
(0.436) 
[-0.273] 
changeTD*Treatment    
-0.865** 
(0.405) 
[-0.199] 
symmetry*Treatment    
-0.147 
(0.248) 
[-0.040] 
Treatment 
-1.359*** 
(0.202) 
[-0.253] 
  
-0.782*** 
(0.299) 
[-0.256] 
Male 
0.260 
(0.160) 
[0.048] 
0.216 
(0.148) 
[0.049] 
0.369 
(0.399) 
[0.048] 
0.264 
(0.162) 
[0.049] 
Age 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
[-0.001] 
0.005 
(0.011) 
[0.001] 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
[-0.003] 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
[-0.001] 
Education 
0.296 
(0.194) 
[0.055] 
0.138 
(0.108) 
[0.032] 
1.116* 
(0.641) 
[0.145] 
0.300 
(0.197) 
[0.056] 
Work Experience 
0.030 
(0.187) 
[0.006] 
-0.017 
(0.196) 
[-0.004] 
0.044 
(0.386) 
[0.006] 
0.029 
(0.188) 
[0.005] 
CRT 
0.235 
(0.187) 
[0.044] 
0.091 
(0.182) 
[0.021] 
0.611 
(0.547) 
[0.080] 
0.237 
(0.189) 
[0.044] 
Observations 2,024 1,083 941 2,024 
Pseudo R² 0.089 0.043 0.038 0.096 
Note: We estimate logistic regressions with the natural logarithm of the odds ratio to take a tax-
minimizing decision as a dependent variable. For Model (2), the sample is reduced to the time-
pressure treatment, while Model (3) is estimated for the no time pressure group. Robust 
standard errors are estimated and clustered on subject level (provided in parentheses). Average 
marginal effects are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 8: Summary statistics: Share of tax-minimizing decisions and personal experience 
for changeTLCF and changeTD items 
Panel A:  Share of tax-minimizing decisions per subject dependent on work experience 
Treatment Time Pressure No Time Pressure Full Sample 
changeTLCF Item Group 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
No Work Experience 0.496 3.448 0.798 5.758 0.621 4.429 
Moderate Work Experience 0.325 4.886 0.844 7.640 0.556 6.145 
Difference 0.171** -1.438** -0.045 -1.883*** 0.066 -1.716*** 
p-Value 0.033 0.017 0.325 0.002 0.199 < 0.001 
       
No Work Experience 0.496 3.448 0.798 5.758 0.621 4.429 
Advanced Work Experience 0.324 4.686 0.917 6.563 0.561 5.463 
Difference 0.172** -1.238** -0.118 -0.804 0.060 -1.033** 
p-Value 0.040 0.028 0.127 0.155 0.235 0.030 
       
Moderate Experience 0.325 4.886 0.844 7.640 0.556 6.145 
Advanced Work Experience 0.324 4.686 0.917 6.563 0.561 5.463 
Difference 0.001 0.200 -0.073 1.078** -0.006 0.683 
p-Value 0.497 0.397 0.219 0.003 0.478 0.112 
       
changeTD Item Group 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
No Work Experience 0.511 3.236 0.782 5.823 0.623 4.320 
Moderate Work Experience 0.396 4.325 0.891 7.609 0.616 5.785 
Difference 0.116 -1.089** -0.108 -1.787*** 0.008 -1.465*** 
p-Value 0.105 0.038 0.117 0.003 0.459 0.003 
       
No Work Experience 0.511 3.236 0.782 5.823 0.623 4.320 
Advanced Work Experience 0.519 4.623 0.931 6.236 0.683 5.290 
Difference -0.007 -1.386** -0.148* -0.414 -0.060 -0.970** 
p-Value 0.468 0.011 0.065 0.300 0.208 0.036 
       
Moderate Experience 0.396 4.325 0.891 7.609 0.616 5.785 
Advanced Work Experience 0.519 4.623 0.931 6.236 0.683 5.290 
Difference -0.123 -0.298 -0.040 1.373*** -0.068 0.494 
p-Value 0.143 0.350 0.292 0.009 0.231 0.203 
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Panel B:  Share of tax-minimizing decisions per subject dependent on education 
Treatment Time Pressure No Time Pressure Full Sample 
changeTLCF Item Group 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of 
Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
No Education 0.435 3.656 0.802 6.167 0.606 4.837 
Education 0.380 4.997 0.977 7.591 0.553 5.812 
Difference 0.055 -1.341*** -0.175** -1.424** 0.053 -0.974** 
p-Value 0.251 0.010 0.038 0.022 0.234 0.025 
       
changeTD Item Group 
Share of tax-
minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of tax-
minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
Share of tax-
minimizing 
Decisions 
Mean of 
Indicated 
Confidence 
No Education 0.498 3.472 0.811 6.111 0.644 4.726 
Education 0.457 4.454 0.977 7.614 0.607 5.368 
Difference 0.042 -0.982** -0.167** -1.503** 0.037 -0.642* 
p-Value 0.299 0.032 0.033 0.017 0.295 0.092 
Note: This table presents the average share of tax-minimizing decisions per subject for the changeTLCF item group (Panel 
A) and the changeTD item group (Panel B). Indicated Confidence is the self-stated degree of confidence in having identified 
the tax-minimizing form of intra-group financing for a particular item (scale: 0-8). No Work Experience denotes subjects who 
do not have work experience in the field of accounting, taxation, and/or finance while Moderate Work Experience includes 
subjects who have less than six months of relevant work experience. Advanced Work Experience involves subjects who have 
more than six months of relevant work experience. Education covers participants who study in a graduate program for 
accounting, taxation, and/or finance, while No Education refers to subjects without relevant education. A two-sample t-test is 
performed to compare means. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 9:  Summary statistics: Share of tax-minimizing decisions per item 
Treatment 
 
 
Item 
Time Pressure No Time Pressure Difference p-Value Full Sample 
Share of Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Share of Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
  Share of Tax-
Minimizing 
Decisions 
Item 1 0.739 0.814 -0.074 0.160 0.773 
Item 2 0.723 0.914 -0.191*** 0.003 0.813 
Item 3 0.700 0.847 -0.147*** 0.024 0.767 
Item 4 0.700 0.797 -0.097 0.107 0.744 
Item 5 0.382 0.780 -0.397*** < 0.001 0.567 
Item 6 0.424 0.797 -0.372*** < 0.001 0.600 
Item 7 0.435 0.814 -0.379*** < 0.001 0.609 
Item 8 0.522 0.949 -0.427*** < 0.001 0.719 
Item 9 0.716 0.780 -0.063 0.210 0.746 
Item 10 0.667 0.898 -0.232*** < 0.001 0.773 
Item 11 0.739 0.814 0.074 0.160 0.773 
Item 12 0.583 0.862 -0.279*** < 0.001 0.720 
Item 13 0.493 0.776 -0.283*** < 0.001 0.624 
Item 14 0.493 0.898 -0.406*** < 0.001 0.683 
Item 15 0.594 0.864 -0.270*** < 0.001 0.719 
Item 16 0.478 0.831 -0.352*** < 0.001 0.641 
      
Item 5 0.382 0.780   0.567 
Item 6 0.424 0.797   0.600 
Difference -0.042 -0.017   -0.033 
p-Value 0.312 0.412   0.298 
      
Item 5 0.382 0.780   0.567 
Item 7 0.435 0.814   0.609 
Difference -0.053 -0.034   -0.042 
p-Value 0.268 0.325   0.247 
      
Item 5 0.382 0.780   0.567 
Item 8 0.522 0.949   0.719 
Difference -0.139* -0.169***   -0.152*** 
p-Value 0.051 0.003   0.006 
      
Item 13 0.493 0.776   0.624 
Item 14 0.493 0.898   0.683 
Difference 0.000 -0.122**   -0.059 
p-Value 0.500 0.036   0.166 
      
Item 13 0.493 0.776   0.624 
Item 15 0.594 0.864   0.719 
Difference -0.102 -0.089   -0.095* 
p-Value 0.119 0.108   0.055 
      
Item 13 0.493 0.776   0.624 
Item 16 0.478 0.831   0.641 
Difference 0.014 -0.055   -0.017 
p-Value 0.566 0.231   0.393 
Note: This table presents the average share of tax-minimizing decisions per item. A two-sample t-test is performed to compare 
means. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed). 
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Table 10:  Additional regression results for H3 and H4 
Tax Minimizing  
Decision 
Full 
Sample 
(1) 
Time 
Pressure
(2) 
No Time
Pressure
(3) 
Full 
Sample 
(4) 
Time 
Pressure
(5) 
No Time
Pressure
(6) 
Full 
Sample 
changeTLCF
(7) 
Time 
Pressure 
changeTLCF
(8) 
No Time 
Pressure 
changeTLCF
(9) 
Full 
Sample 
changeTD
(10) 
Time 
Pressure
changeTD
(11) 
No Time 
Pressure 
changeTD 
(12) 
Constant 2.089*** (0.391) 
0.494 
(0.401) 
2.281*** 
(0.643) 
1.933*** 
(0.352) 
0.628** 
(0.288) 
1.783*** 
(0.530) 
2.762*** 
(0.858) 
0.560 
(0.657) 
1.968 
(1.747) 
1.046** 
(0.483) 
-0.500 
(0.488) 
0.422 
(0.973) 
changeTLCF 
-0.504* 
(0.263) 
[-0.157] 
-0.541 
(0.333) 
[-0.266] 
-0.410 
(0.415) 
[-0.013] 
-0.782*** 
(0.248) 
[-0.157] 
-1.128*** 
(0.332) 
[-0.272] 
-0.206 
(0.353) 
[-0.012] 
      
changeTD 
-0.492** 
(0.239) 
[-0.114] 
-0.471* 
(0.282) 
[-0.192] 
-0.511 
(0.419) 
[-0.006] 
-0.533** 
(0.219) 
[-0.113] 
-0.751*** 
(0.265) 
[-0.199] 
-0.149 
(0.348) 
[-0.004] 
      
symmetry  
-0.222 
(0.195) 
[-0.025] 
-0.251 
(0.248) 
[-0.040] 
-0.141 
(0.300) 
[-0.006] 
-0.189 
(0.162) 
[-0.026] 
-0.259 
(0.217) 
[-0.040] 
-0.038 
(0.206) 
[-0.005] 
      
changeTLCF* 
Moderate Work Experience 
-0.799 
(0.572) 
[-0.263] 
-1.893*** 
(0.710) 
[-0.486] 
0.774 
(0.835) 
[0.054] 
   
      
changeTLCF* 
Advanced Work Experience
-0.465 
(0.552) 
[-0.178] 
-0.991 
(0.694) 
[-0.350] 
0.880 
(1.023) 
[0.037] 
   
      
changeTD* 
Moderate Work Experience 
-0.449 
(0.535) 
[-0.184] 
-1.498*** 
(0.579) 
[-0.386] 
1.298 
(0.877) 
[0.109] 
   
      
changeTD* 
Advanced Work Experience
0.071 
(0.435) 
[-0.073] 
-0.313 
(0.515) 
[-0.167] 
1.236* 
(0.675) 
[0.053] 
   
      
symmetry* 
Moderate Work Experience 
-0.018 
(0.281) 
[-0.045] 
-0.234 
(0.390) 
[-0.090] 
0.174 
(0.363) 
[0.005] 
   
      
symmetry* 
Advanced Work Experience
0.515 
(0.365) 
[0.048] 
0.589 
(0.460) 
[0.071] 
0.356 
(0.564) 
[0.017] 
   
      
changeTLCF*Education    
-0.050 
(0.495) 
[-0.153] 
-0.113 
(0.573) 
[-0.282] 
1.921 
(1.447) 
[0.073] 
      
changeTD*Education    
-0.206 
(0.447) 
[-0.134] 
-0.369 
(0.478) 
[-0.252] 
1.864 
(1.445) 
[0.073] 
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symmetry*Education    
0.207 
(0.275) 
[0.003] 
0.273 
(0.342) 
[0.003] 
0.038 
(0.385) 
[0.000] 
      
delta25000       
0.169 
(0.254) 
[0.031] 
0.205 
(0.350) 
[0.047] 
0.113 
(0.341) 
[0.014] 
0.296 
(0.245) 
[0.057] 
0.017 
(0.328) 
[0.004] 
1.001*** 
(0.364) 
[0.122] 
delta60000       
0.223 
(0.218) 
[0.031] 
0.232 
(0.313) 
[0.053] 
0.232 
(0.232) 
[0.028] 
0.503* 
(0.275) 
[0.097] 
0.423 
(0.340) 
[0.104] 
0.662 
(0.460) 
[0.080] 
delta200000       
0.838*** 
(0.248) 
[0.155] 
0.623* 
(0.322) 
[0.144] 
1.772*** 
(0.534) 
[0.215] 
0.085 
(0.255) 
[0.016] 
-0.063 
(0.332) 
[-0.016] 
0.381 
(0.385) 
[0.046] 
Treatment 
-1.368*** 
(0.203) 
[-0.253] 
  
-1.360*** 
(0.202) 
[-0.253] 
  
-2.017*** 
(0.325) 
[-0.374] 
  
-1.647*** 
(0.301) 
[-0.317] 
  
Male 
0.267* 
(0.160) 
[0.049] 
0.234 
(0.152) 
[0.052] 
0.349 
(0.388) 
[0.005] 
0.261 
(0.160) 
[0.049] 
0.218 
(0.148) 
[0.050] 
0.370 
(0.401) 
[0.048] 
0.076 
(0.309) 
[0.014] 
0.025 
(0.316) 
[0.006] 
0.171 
(0.758) 
[0.021] 
0.268 
(0.259) 
[0.052] 
0.234 
(0.273) 
[0.057] 
0.330 
(0.605) 
[0.040] 
Age 
-0.014 
(0.013) 
[-0.003] 
0.001 
(0.015) 
[0.000] 
-0.032 
(0.021) 
[-0.004] 
-0.005 
(0.012) 
[-0.001] 
0.005 
(0.011) 
[0.001] 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
[-0.003] 
-0.052 
(0.033) 
[-0.010] 
-0.030 
(0.024) 
[-0.007] 
-0.051 
(0.063) 
[-0.006] 
0.008 
(0.015) 
[0.002] 
0.020 
(0.017) 
[0.005] 
0.000 
(0.030) 
[0.000] 
Education 
0.261 
(0.199) 
[0.048] 
0.111 
(0.226) 
[0.025] 
1.036* 
(0.617) 
[0.133] 
0.321 
(0.364) 
[0.054] 
0.208 
(0.367) 
[0.031] 
0.451 
(0.860) 
[0.113] 
0.540 
(0.336) 
[0.100] 
0.603 
(0.435) 
[0.139] 
2.247** 
(1.115) 
[0.273] 
0.183 
(0.298) 
[0.035] 
0.049 
(0.405) 
[0.012] 
2.160** 
(0.985) 
[0.262] 
Work Experience    
0.028 
(0.187) 
[0.005] 
-0.022 
(0.195) 
[-0.005] 
0.044 
(0.387) 
[0.006] 
-0.465 
(0.364) 
[-0.086] 
-1.012** 
(0.418) 
[-0.233] 
0.285 
(0.747) 
[0.035] 
0.027 
(0.300) 
[0.005] 
-0.339 
(0.386) 
[-0.083] 
0.704 
(0.589) 
[0.085] 
Moderate Work Experience 
0.246 
(0.429) 
[-0.020] 
0.912** 
(0.464) 
[-0.017] 
-0.847 
(0.631) 
[-0.043] 
         
Advanced Work Experience
0.277 
(0.389) 
[0.049] 
0.317 
(0.462) 
[0.021] 
0.021 
(0.590) 
[0.067] 
   
      
CRT 
0.211 
(0.190) 
[0.039] 
0.067 
(0.186) 
[0.015] 
0.707 
(0.594) 
[0.091] 
0.236 
(0.187) 
[0.044] 
0.093 
(0.183) 
[0.021] 
0.613 
(0.550) 
[0.080] 
0.083 
(0.292) 
[0.015] 
-0.261 
(0.316) 
[-0.060) 
0.962 
(0.873) 
[0.117] 
0.173 
(0.275) 
[0.033] 
-0.046 
(0.321) 
[-0.011] 
0.780 
(0.729) 
[0.095] 
Observations 2,024 1,083 941 2,024 1,083 941 508 272 236 507 272 235 
Pseudo R² 0.095 0.064 0.058 0.089 0.044 0.047 0.169 0.050 0.141 0.109 0.014 0.106 
Note: We estimate logistic regressions with the natural logarithm of the odds ratio to take a tax-minimizing decision as a dependent variable. For Models (2), (5), (8) and (11), the sample is reduced to 
the time-pressure treatment, while Models (3), (6), (9) and (12) are estimated for the no time pressure group. Models (7) through (9) involve observations for changeTLCF, and Models (10) through 
(12) for changeTD, respectively. Robust standard errors are estimated and clustered on subject level (provided in parentheses). Average marginal effects are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
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Table 11:  Supplementary tests 
Tax Minimizing  
Decision 
Full 
Sample 
(1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Full 
Sample 
(3) 
Constant 2.358*** (0.560) 
1.380*** 
(0.310) 
1.141*** 
(0.210) 
changeTLCF 
-0.522* 
(0.307) 
[-0.081] 
-0.586*** 
(0.185) 
[-0.117] 
-0.454*** 
(0.126) 
[-0.142] 
changeTD 
-0.276 
(0.302) 
[-0.043] 
-0.341** 
(0.161) 
[-0.068] 
-0.330*** 
(0.113) 
[-0.104] 
symmetry  
-0.153 
(0.187) 
[-0.024] 
-0.067 
(0.116) 
[-0.013] 
-0.076 
(0.076) 
[-0.024] 
Treatment 
-1.322*** 
(0.242) 
[-0.206] 
-1.077*** 
(0.163) 
[-0.214] 
-0.800*** 
(0.114) 
[-0.251] 
Male 
0.098 
(0.268) 
[0.015] 
0.318** 
(0.133) 
[0.063] 
0.161* 
(0.097) 
[0.050] 
Age 
-0.026 
(0.018) 
[-0.004] 
-0.001 
(0.010) 
[-0.000] 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
[-0.001] 
Education 
0.479 
(0.320) 
[0.075] 
0.161 
(0.182) 
[0.032] 
0.191 
(0.120) 
[0.060] 
Work Experience 
0.178 
(0.302) 
[0.028] 
0.091 
(0.151) 
[0.018] 
0.018 
(0.113) 
[0.006] 
CRT 
0.294 
(0.343) 
[0.046] 
0.427*** 
(0.159) 
[0.085] 
0.150 
(0.114) 
[0.047] 
Observations 1,264 2,629 2,024 
Pseudo R squared 0.089 0.063 0.088 
Note: We estimate logistic regressions with the natural logarithm of the odds 
ratio to take a tax-minimizing decision as a dependent variable under Models 
(1) and (2), and a probit regression under Model (3). All regressions include 
observations for the time-pressure and no-time-pressure treatments. Under 
Model (1), the sample is reduced to the subjects who provided a decision on 
all 16 items and passed the check questions, while model (2) includes 
subjects who did not pass the check questions. Model (3) uses the same 
sample as the regressions in Tables 8 and 9. Robust standard errors are 
estimated and clustered on subject level (provided in parentheses). Average 
marginal effects are shown in brackets. ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively (two-tailed). 
